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Abstract
Online Social Networks (OSNs) are a unique construct that is shaped by the advancement and availability of Internet
technologies. A large portion of internet users make use of OSN services to share and celebrate their personal lives with
friends and family. A substantial proportion of these shared experiences revolve around privacy-sensitive information. The OSN
services handling privacy-sensitive information deploy state-of-the-art security and privacy-preserving mechanisms. However, these
protections are, to a great extent, not consumer-centric: this is the main focus of this study. In this paper, we define the notion
of Consumer-Centric Protection (CCP) for OSNs. In this proposal, the individual user controls how her data can be accessed by
her contacts (e.g. friends and family members) and others, thus giving control of user data back to the rightful owner — the user.
This work is still in progress and in this paper we present our preliminary results.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In our societies, social structures define sets of social entities and their roles/responsibilities. Such formations are so
fundamental to human societies that with the advent of any technological revolution in communication, it is inevitably translated
into new means of communication. Examples include pen-pals using letters, telephones and internet chat.
The advent of the internet also introduced the concept of the cyber world and the constructs of the real world were then
translated and in some cases reinterpreted. Among these structures were social networks that were translated into social
networking sites. There are a number of social networking sites including Facebook, Google+, Twitter, Pinterest and LinkedIn,
to name just a few. A large number of online users engage in one way or another with these social network sites, which are
also called “Online Social Networks (OSNs)”.
OSNs project themselves as human-centric services that facilitate the sharing and exchanging of life experiences. In most
OSNs (e.g. Facebook, Google+) the user data resides on the network and providers use it to target their services to individual
users [1]. In certain situations such sharing of information might be detrimental to the users’ privacy and security [2, 3].
The openness and accessibility of the information on OSNs has created some unintended consequences, including employers
or potential employers evaluating a job applicant’s OSN profile. Furthermore, facial recognition technologies can be used to
match an individual with his/her OSN profile [4, 5]. To provide a secure and privacy-preserving service, certain OSNs have
updated their privacy policies. These steps are commendable; however, the security and privacy of the data is still placed in the
hands of the consumers. If a user does not configure her privacy setting properly, she may end up sharing more than intended
while maintaining a false sense of security. It is correct that applying default settings with strong privacy requirements is one
potential solution; however, in our opinion a consumer-centric mechanism would empower the user more.
In this paper, we focus on a consumer-centric privacy mechanism that provides a seamless and least-interaction-based
framework. The aim is to build a framework that does not require consumers to change their normal behaviour in terms of
how they use the relevant OSN, and does not require any additional configuration/tasks to be performed by the consumer. As
a case study, we base our development on Facebook: the rationale for choosing it was its top position in terms of number of
total users and daily visits.
The proposed consumer-centric protection mechanism is based on state-of-the-art cryptographic mechanisms that secure the
user’s data before uploading it to the appropriate OSN. To do so, we have proposed an additional layer between the web
browser at the user’s end and OSN interface (website). This additional layer takes care of all security- and privacy-related
tasks in a seamless manner. Only the authorised entity, the data owner1 can decrypt it. The encryption and decryption process
is completely hidden from the user and she does not even realise that such an operation is taking place, thus meeting our
seamless integration requirement.
1Data Owner: In this paper, the data owner is referred to as the user or entity who uploads the data on an OSN.
A. Contributions of the Paper
The key contributions of the paper include but are not limited to the list below.
1) Giving control of data to users, not to any centralised authority (i.e. OSN operator)
2) A seamless framework that does not require users to change their behaviour to use their preferred OSN
3) A consumer-oriented privacy framework that encrypts all user activities like sending text messages, status updates, and
uploading images.
4) A secure key sharing mechanism to enable only authorised users to view the information (i.e. messages and images)
B. Structure of the Paper
In section II, we briefly discuss OSNs and associated security and privacy issues. This section also looks at the existing
work in the field of OSN data privacy and how it compares to the proposed framework in this paper. Section III provides a
rationale for the consumer-oriented privacy-preserving framework proposed in this paper, along with the requirements for the
proposed framework and a generic architecture. In section IV, we describe the implementation of our framework to provide
consumer-oriented privacy. Finally in section V we conclude the paper and provide future research directions.
II. ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS
In this section, we briefly introduce OSNs and discuss the related security and privacy issues. The section concludes with
the discussion of existing solutions that provide data control in OSNs.
A. Brief Introduction
The phenomenon known as OSNs began with the first well-known site called SixDegrees.com [6], which implied the potential
to connect any two users in the world. The upsurge in OSNs began in 2003 [6] when sites like LinkedIn, Facebook, YouTube
and Twitter offered their services to online consumers. The advent of OSN sites has had a profound effect on both business
and popular culture [7].
The main objective of the OSNs was to foster closer connections and collaborations between individuals who are either in
a social network in the real world or who are part of an online community. This objective brought a unique set of risks and
challenges; nevertheless, consumers have flocked to these services in large numbers and usage is still growing at a phenomenal
rate [8]. A pivotal role in this proliferation is played by the accessibility and ease with which a user can share his or her
information and gain a sense of relationship and intimacy with friends and family on an OSN [9].
A huge amount of personal information is being shared by OSN users and the OSN operators can use this information to
target their customers or shape their services according to customers’ requirements [10]. With the advent of smartphones, a new
dimension to OSNs was created that targets the more tech-savvy customers. There is a multitude of smartphone applications,
provided by traditional OSNs like Facebook and Twitter, along with smartphone-based OSN providers like Snapchat and
WeChat. In this paper, we will focus only on the traditional OSNs; however, the proposed framework in its generic architecture
could also be deployed as part of the smartphone-based OSNs.
User-generated data is crucial for both the user and respective OSN business models. However, the architecture and roles
around this user data are vague. Both the user and the OSN can simultaneously assume the role of data controller (owner) and
data processor [1]. The architecture and associated services of an OSN are provisioned and maintained by the OSN operator,
which can then qualify as a data controller for the user’s data (account and usage data) after the user’s consent [11]. The
OSN operator can use this information for commercial benefits. In contrast, the user can qualify as the data controller for the
personal data which (s)he publishes on the OSN, such as pictures, videos and messages. For such data, the OSN should be
merely the data processor, which stores and publishes the user data.
However, the oversimplified explanation of how data is managed by an OSN as presented above might not be correct in
many situations. There are a number of OSNs and their respective privacy policies declare that the operator has the right
to use the user’s (uploaded) data for their own commercial purposes [1]. The wide range of services that facilitate real-time
communication and exchange of data (images, videos, and messages, etc.), and the security and privacy concerns around such
data have emerged as a critical issue [12]. Such concerns are discussed at various levels including by industry, academia and
even governments [10]. We will discuss these concerns succinctly and examine the existing proposals for potential solutions
to such concerns.
B. Security and Privacy Issues
The security and privacy concerns regarding OSNs stem from the lack of a strong track record for protecting users’ privacy
[13]. If a user makes a misconfiguration or the OSN does not provide a robust privacy management facility, it is difficult to
protect a user’s data from being copied and used for nefarious purposes [14]. The privacy risks associated with user data on
the OSN include but are not limited to the list below:
1) Loss of control of data (storage, access, and dissemination)
2) No control of how such data is used by third parties
3) Potential for identity theft
In addition to the above list, there are other concerns about the privacy of the data as highlighted by social phishing. In
social phishing, a malicious user can learn about a user through his or her OSN profiles/information and then try to use this
information to again access to or advantage from the user’s friends, family or colleagues. The personal information presented
online can also be used by online crooks, stalkers and bullies [15]. There are also instances in which information available on
OSNs used to spy on citizens or foreigners [16].
Disclosing information on OSNs cannot be curbed: it is difficult to convince users to stop using OSNs or limit the information
that they share. A large portion of OSN users do understand the privacy risks but still use the sites either because of lack
of strong privacy protection tools or the idea that such information cannot be used in any damaging way [17]. An important
point to note is that information shared over an OSN is more or less permanent and making it disappear or removing it is
potentially a difficult proposition [18]. Users will keep on sharing information and there will be the potential for breaches by
different actors in the OSN ecosystem.
There is a misconception that most OSN users are not interested in data privacy [19]. In this paper, the notion of privacy
is defined as control over the access, flow and usage of user data uploaded on OSNs. The user who is uploading the data
should be helped to exercise his/her rights over his/her data. This is the main objective of this paper and the proposed
framework. Furthermore, in the context of this paper we assume all three entities (Service Providers, Other Users, and Third-
Party Applications) to be less than trustworthy.
C. Existing Solutions
There are two clear categories of work on security and privacy for OSNs. These two categories include centralised OSNs
and decentralised OSNs. The centralised OSN is more prevalent and as the name suggests, there is a trusted or controlling
authority. Examples of such OSNs include Facebook, LinkedIn and Google+. By contrast, in a decentralised OSN there is no
such authority and the network is based on a peer-to-peer architecture. Examples of such OSNs include Safebook2, Cachet
[20] and Vis-a-Vis [21]. In this section, we will briefly discuss different proposals for both of these OSN categories.
Cutilo et al [22] proposed a privacy-preserving OSN based on a decentralised architecture. Privacy was achieved by
deployment of a peer-to-peer architecture. Backes et al [23] proposed an Application Programming Interface (API) to provide
security in distributed OSNs. The proposed solution provided user anonymity via pseudonyms and deployed zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge to prove the existence of social relationships with other users. They claimed that the deployment of zero-
knowledge proof enables users to communicate with other users without sacrificing user anonymity. Beside these there are a
number of proposals for decentralised OSNs that mainly focus on privacy and user anonymity along with social graph searches
and relationship proofs [24]. In this paper, we are not putting forward any proposals for building a decentralised OSN. The
proposal presented in this paper focuses on the challenge of consumer-centric privacy protection in centralised OSNs.
The XBook proposal presented by Singh et al [25] tries to solve the issues of information leaks to third-party applications
using an information flow model. This proposal targeted Facebook users and as part of their implementation they created a
Facebook application to provide Proof-of-Concept (PoC). Beside information flow models, another prevalent way of managing
user privacy in centralised OSNs is though user-defined access control [26]. Squicciarini et al proposed a fine-grained access
control policy based on collaboration between different users [27]. This policy requires all users that have a stake in a piece
of data (i.e. images) to sign off the access control policy, so no single user can make decisions on his/her own.
Our proposal is for centralised OSNs and for an initial PoC we are aiming for user privacy on Facebook. The proposed
framework is closer to access control; however, we cannot precisely term it this. The idea is to protect user data with strong
cryptography and only allow users with authorisation from the original user to decrypt the data. A more detailed discussion
on the proposal is provided in the next section.
III. CONSUMER-CENTRIC PROTECTION FOR ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORKS
In this section we discuss the rationale behind our proposal, along with the design challenges faced. Finally, the section
ends with a succinct description of the proposed framework and why we selected Facebook for our PoC.
A. Rationale for Consumer-Centric Protection
A large number of online users have opted in to various OSNs and most of these OSNs are based on a centralised architecture.
Therefore, our choice of target OSN type was based on deployment and consumer population.
In centralised OSNs, proposing a mechanism that requires modifications to the deployed architecture is attractive and can
be argued to provide a more robust solution. However, in most cases, achieving this in real terms is close to impossible.
Therefore, we chose to provide an OSN-independent solution. This even included the option of creating an application for the
OSN provider.
2Safebook web link: www.safebook.us
The rationale behind a consumer-oriented solution is to empower the user, the main driving force of any business and
especially of OSNs. Users have the most at stake in the OSN ecosystem, as it’s their data and in certain situations leakage
of it would be detrimental to their privacy and possibly even their physical security. This provides a strong reason to design
a solution that is aimed at the users but at the same time does not require them to change their activity patterns. Modifying
how a user performs mundane tasks usually either ends up being ignored or else the user just opts out of it: an example of
this is the secure email and (smartphone) online messaging services [28].
Furthermore, when designing consumer-oriented solutions, the proposal should require minimal interaction on the user’s
part and accomplish most of the security- and privacy-related operations seamlessly in the background [29]. Therefore, the
proposal not only has to provide a robust, scalable, secure and privacy-preserving architecture but it also has to be a lightweight
mechanism that performs most of the tasks with minimal user interaction.
B. Requirements for Consumer-Centric Protection
In this section we propose the fundamental requirements for the proposed framework. These requirements are by no means
an exhaustive list, but should be taken as the initial set of requirements at the current stage of the work on consumer-oriented
protection.
1) User’s Personal Space Privacy: The user’s personal space on the OSN refers to their profile, messages (e.g. status
updates) and images. This requirement demands that information present on the personal space of the user should only be
accessible3 to the users and to entities as defined by the users.
2) User’s Communication Privacy: Individual users might communicate with their contacts using OSN services. All such
communications should be protected and only the intended recipients should be able to access the information.
3) Privilege to Reveal and Control: Finally, users should have total control over their information. This total control extends
to not only include users’ friends and family but also OSN providers.
C. Contradictory Design Considerations
Any proposal that is put forward as an add-on to an existing architecture that is well established and has strong user experience
associated with it has to consider design requirements. These design requirements stipulate how the new functionality can be
added to the existing architecture with the least changes to users’ experience of the service. Therefore, to accommodate
security and privacy with the user experience the proposed framework has to find a balance between the contradictory designs
requirements listed below:
1) Social Space Exploring vs Privacy: Social searches, either carried out by the OSN provider to find suitable matches for
its consumers, or searches carried out by the users themselves, require that certain information regarding the user profile is
available for social search purposes. The need to be discovered by potential or existing (real-life) friends and the need for
robust privacy have to be balanced. In our proposal the user’s basic profile information is kept public, which in most cases is
required by the OSN operator. Aside from this information, all other information, such as user messages, status updates and
images, could be protected.
2) Social Interaction vs Privacy: Social interaction is one of the main objectives and services that most consumers want
from their respective OSN providers. With social interaction there is always a potential that information might be leaked. For
example, user ‘A’ shares some images with user ‘B’. However, user ‘B’ copies the images and publishes them with the consent
of user ‘A’. Unfortunately, this is a violation of the trust that exists between users and our proposal provides protection to the
extent that only user ‘B’ can view the images. What if user ‘B’ opts for publishing these images? Our proposal cannot stop
it from doing so. This is a compromise that we have made between the desires to have a social interaction while protecting
the communicated information from non-participants.
3) OSN Business Model vs Privacy: OSN providers have built their business models on mining the data provided by
their consumers. In some cases the data is used to provide targeted advertisements. In this case we sided with the privacy
requirements of the user and the proposed framework allows a user to protect all of his/her information that is uploaded to
the OSN provider. However, the OSN provider can still use usage patterns, connection location/frequencies and page likes to
support their business model.
The generic architecture of our proposal is discussed in the next section, followed by the rationale for why we choose
Facebook to be the host OSN for our PoC.
D. Proposed Architecture for Consumer-Centric Protection
The proposal is required to be a seamless and least-interaction solution. For this reason we are proposing a thin and
lightweight layer called “Consumer-Oriented Protection (COP)” to be added to the traditional model of the OSN. Figure 1
shows a reference architecture for an OSN with the proposed COP layer.
3Accessibility in this context means access to the understandable (plaintext) information and not the encrypted information.
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Figure 1. Reference Architecture of an OSN with Proposed COP Layer
The basic components of an OSN are constructed over the hardware infrastructure and the underlying operating system. The
data storage layer deals with different storage technologies to support a reliant and robust architecture. The content management
layer is where most of the OSN management services are deployed and this layer deals with the user/data management, access
control and content aggregation. On top of this layer is the application layer that provides user-oriented services like searches,
music, videos and photo rendering. The user interface is the layer that a user directly interacts with and it is in most cases the
website of the OSN. Our proposed layer sits on the top of the user interface without requiring any change to it. It should be
implemented as a transparent layer and from the users’ point of view they should be directly interacting with the user interface.
However, before the user interface transfers information to the application layer the COP will enforce the user’s protection
policies.
From an operational point of view, the user interface is presented to the user via a web browser. Therefore, the most suitable
place for our proposal to be implemented is at the web browser. Therefore, the proposed COP is implemented as an add-on to
the web browser that observes the user’s activities and for data where a privacy policy has to be enforced, it interrupts these
data transfers and treats the data accordingly.
There are three main protection operations that the COP preforms: encrypting and decrypting data and key exchange. In
addition, from an operational point of view the COP also retrieves the user’s contacts and any groupings defined on the OSN
(e.g. user groups on Facebook). As a design ideology we opted for not storing user’s contacts to any server, including the
COP’s server4.
E. Facebook: Biggest Online Social Network
Facebook is the top OSN provider by far in the market. The total number of active users and unique visitors to Facebook
makes it the major market leader [8]. For this reason we chose Facebook for our initial PoC. Although in this paper we are
only discussing the Facebook implementation, in future we would like to extend it to other major OSNs.
IV. CONSUMER-CENTRIC PROTECTION FOR FACEBOOK
In this section we very briefly discuss the current state of the PoC for the COP proposal based on Facebook.
A. Initial Implementation
As our initial PoC implementation, we developed an add-on for the Firefox browser. This add-on represents the COP layer
depicted in Figure 1. The browser add-on interrupts status update, message sent and image upload events. After intercepting
these events, the add-on then encrypts these data values accordingly. For encryption we are using Advance Encryption Standard
(AES) in Cipher-Feedback Mode (CFM) and Galois/Counter Model (GCM). For key share mechanism, we have currently
implemented ECC based encryption/decryption mechanism. The AES keys used to encrypted data is embedded with the data
encrypted with the public key of the intended recepient. Similarly, when a user browses a Facebook page and there are some
items that are encrypted, the add-on automatically detects them. It then decrypts them and displays them to the user. In all this
process of encryption and decryption the user is not actively involved. The user only has to enable the encryption of different
data types (e.g. status update, messages and images).
4In its current stage of the PoC, the COP proposal is based on a completely decentralised architecture. However, further experiments and evaluation are
required to decide which architecture would be most suitable for the COP proposal.
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Figure 2. Status update message before and after encryption
Figure 2 shows the before and after situation when a user updates his or her status on Facebook. When the user clicks the
“Post” button or presses “Enter,” the add-on captures the data (in this case the “Testing Status”) and encrypts it. The encrypted
value is displayed to the user. A point to note is that on the next page refresh or after a certain amount of time, the encrypted
status will be displayed to user as plaintext as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3 also shows that when a user comments on a status update, message or an image, the add-on interrupts the data and
encrypts it.
As with previous operations, in Figure 4 a user is uploading images to Facebook. The add-on interrupts the uploading
processing and encrypts the image before transferring it to the OSN server.
All of the operations discussed in this section are performed by the add-on in a seamless manner. We do not modify the
OSN interface. The only implementation is done as part of the browser add-on.
B. Challenges Ahead
In the current iteration, we have implemented the encryption, decryption and basic key share. The basic key share is peer-
to-peer in which the key is only shared in one-to-one relationships. What this means is that a user can communicate securely
with only one user at a time. The key share is achieved by embedding the key sharing information in the communicated data
(messages and images). However, at present we are working on key sharing in one-to-many relationships. There are multiple
ways we can achieve this that include using a group key, via a centralised server (i.e. potentially a key distribution server:
COP Server) or a decentralised architecture. We have to perform extensive evaluation before selecting a suitable solution.
Furthermore, we are trying to optimise the add-on in a manner that imposes minimal performance penalties. In future work,
we would also like to evaluate our proposal for security and robustness. Finally, we would like to port the add-on to other
browsers with support for additional OSNs.
V. CONCLUSION
The privacy of user data is of paramount importance and it has received, to some extent, the necessary attention from
academics, the public, industries and governments. However, the missing link in all the efforts is that most of the solutions are
built from an architecture point of view that is not centred on the consumer, who is, ironically, the entity whose data all of the
solutions are trying to protect. A potential reason for this might be that users are considered to be either the weakest link or
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Figure 3. Comments before and after encryption
not technically sound enough to carry out complex security-related tasks. However, we consider that security does not always
have to require an active interaction with the users. It can be built as a seamless, lightweight and least-interaction mechanism.
Therefore, to provide a consumer-oriented protection for users on OSNs, we have proposed a framework in this paper. The
COP framework is implemented as a web browser add-on that intercepts users’ actions and if required, enforces the privacy
policy. The enforcement of the privacy policy is completed seamlessly and does not require the user’s input. The proposed
framework emphasises that user behaviour and OSN interfaces should not be required to fit the operations of the COP. In fact,
it should be the other way around, where the COP should be implemented in a way that supports user behaviour and the OSN
interface. The proposal in this paper is research in progress and we are highly confident that this proposal can be polished and
refined to provide an effective and robust data privacy system for OSN users.
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